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NEW CONTEXTS AND SPECIAL FACTORS: THE COURT’S NEW
BIVENS FRAMEWORK
Alexander J. Lindvall*
I. INTRODUCTION
For the last several decades, the Court’s Bivens framework1 was reminiscent of the hearsay rule: a general rule with what seemed like unlimited
exceptions. But in two recent decisions—Ziglar v. Abbasi2 and Hernández v.
Mesa3—the Supreme Court provided a new framework for analyzing constitutionally based suits against federal officials. These decisions make clear
that allowing constitutionally based suits against federal officials is the exception; the general rule is that these suits are not allowed. This article gives
an overview of the Court’s decisions in this area and provides a practical
Bivens framework that practitioners should use going forward.
This article proceeds in two parts. Part I provides a brief history of
Bivens suits, beginning with Bivens itself and ending with the Court’s 2007
decision in Wilkie v. Robbins. Part II addresses the Court’s two most recent
Bivens decisions—Ziglar v. Abbasi and Hernández v. Mesa—and provides a
law-school-outline-style framework for addressing future Bivens claims.
Long ago, the Supreme Court reminded us:
No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. . . . All the officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of
the law, and are bound to obey it. . . . [And the] Courts of justice are established, not only to decide upon the controverted rights of the citizens
as against each other, but also upon rights in controversy between them
and the government.4

In real-world terms, these decisions mean that many federal officials
will not be held accountable—at least not through the courts—for their disturbing and unconstitutional behavior. I believe the Court’s recent Bivens
decisions are misguided, but they are what practitioners are left with. This
article is meant to show practitioners the framework by which they must
now abide.
* Assistant City Attorney, Civil Division, Mesa, Arizona. J.D., Sandra Day O’Connor
College of Law, Arizona State University. B.A., magna cum laude, Iowa State University.
1. A brief history of Bivens suits can be found in Part II of this article.
2. 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017).
3. 140 S. Ct. 735 (2020).
4. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882).
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II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF BIVENS SUITS
This section proceeds in two parts. Part A discusses the Court’s creation and expansion of Bivens suits between 1971 and 1980. Part B discusses
the Court’s consistent restriction of Bivens between 1980 and 2007.
A.

1971–1980: Creating and Expanding Bivens

Since 1871, there has been a federal statute that allows state and local
officials to be sued for violating the Constitution.5 That statute is now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983.6 However, there is no statutory counterpart that
allows constitutional suits for money damages against federal officials.7
Accordingly, for 100 years, a victim’s right to bring suit for violations of
their constitutional rights largely depended on whether the offending officer
was a state or federal actor.
In 1971, however, in Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents,
the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment contains an implied
cause of action that allows aggrieved citizens to bring money-damages suits
against federal officials for their unconstitutional acts.8 As the Court later
described it: “Bivens established that a citizen suffering a compensable injury to a constitutionally protected interest [can] invoke the general federal
question jurisdiction of the district courts to obtain an award of monetary
damages against the responsible federal official.”9 Since this decision, constitutionally based lawsuits for money damages against the federal government or its agents are commonly called “Bivens suits.”
Bivens arose from the illegal and humiliating search and seizure of
Webster Bivens and his family.10 On November 26, 1965, several Federal
5. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1854 (2017).
6. Originally part of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, section 1983 currently provides:
“Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects . . . any citizen of the United States
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .”
7. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1854; ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 9.1.1 at
631 (6th ed. 2012) (“No federal statute authorizes [the] federal courts to hear suits or give
relief against federal officers who violate the Constitution of the United States.”); see also
Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 650 (1963) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not
apply to the federal government or its officers).
8. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
389, 395–97 (1971); id. at 399 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“I am of the opinion that federal
courts do have the power to award damages for violation of ‘constitutionally protected interests,’ and I agree with the Court that a traditional judicial remedy such as damages is appropriate to the vindication of the personal interests protected by the Fourth Amendment.”).
9. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978).
10. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389.
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Bureau of Narcotics agents entered Bivens’s apartment without a warrant
and arrested him in front of his wife and children.11 After searching his
apartment from “stem to stern,” the agents took Bivens to the local federal
courthouse, where he was “interrogated, booked, and subjected to a visual
strip search.”12 After this incident, relying exclusively on the Fourth
Amendment, Bivens filed a suit for money damages in federal court, alleging that he was unlawfully searched and seized, and that he “suffered great
humiliation, embarrassment, and mental suffering as a result of the agents’
unlawful conduct.”13 The agents sought to dismiss Bivens’s suit, arguing no
federal law allowed suits for money damages against federal officers.14
On appeal, the Supreme Court ruled in Bivens’s favor, finding the
Fourth Amendment itself “gives rise to a cause of action for damages.” 15
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, reasoned that “where federally protected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that
courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief.”16 Although the Fourth Amendment “does not in so many words provide for its enforcement by an award of money damages,”17 in this case, for
Bivens, “it is damages or nothing.”18 Accordingly, Bivens should be entitled
to the “remedial mechanism normally available [to plaintiffs] in the federal
courts” (i.e., money damages).19
Bivens “broke new ground” in the area of civil rights.20 Although the
courts had long allowed suits against federal officials for injunctive relief,21
they had never allowed implied constitutional suits for money damages. 22
The “core premise” underlying Bivens was that enforcing constitutional
rights is incredibly important—so important that it justified the Court in
finding an implied cause of action.23 And given the Court’s reasoning and

11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 389–90.
14. Id. at 390.
15. Id. at 389.
16. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 392 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
17. Id. at 396.
18. Id. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring).
19. Id. at 397.
20. Hernández v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 741 (2020).
21. Anya Bernstein, Congressional Will and the Role of the Executive in Bivens Actions:
What is Special About Special Factors?, 45 IND. L. REV. 719, 725–26 (2012).
22. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66 (2001) (noting that Bivens “recognized for the first time an implied private action for damages against federal officers alleged
to have violated a citizen’s constitutional rights”).
23. Laurence H. Tribe, Death by a Thousand Cuts: Constitutional Wrongs Without
Remedies After Wilkie v. Robbins, 2007 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 23, 25 (2007).
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broad language in Bivens, it seemed possible that this court-made doctrine
might evolve into the federal equivalent of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.24
In the decade that followed, the Court extended Bivens on two occasions. In 1979’s Davis v. Passman, the Court found the Fifth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause contained an implied cause of action that allowed federal employees to sue for wrongful, sex-based discrimination.25 There, Congressman Otto Passman fired his administrative assistant, Shirley Davis,
explicitly because of her sex.26 Passman said it was “essential” that a man
fill her position because of the “unusually heavy work load” in his office.27
Davis sued Passman in federal court, alleging that his explicit sex-based
discrimination violated the Fifth Amendment and entitled her to backpay.28
The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause allows causes of action for sex-based discrimination.29 Justice Brennan, again writing for the Court, maintained that interpreting the
Bill of Rights is not like interpreting a statute.30 The Constitution does not
have the “prolixity of a legal code,” he noted.31 Rather it is the nation’s
“great outline”32 that speaks with a “majestic simplicity.”33 And it is the judiciary’s duty to discern the primary means by which these vague rights will
be enforced.34 After finding that the Fifth Amendment contains an implied
24. Andrew Kent, Are Damages Different?: Bivens and National Security, 87 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1123, 1139 (2014); Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation
and Its Consequences for the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809, 822
(2010) (noting that it was widely assumed among lower courts and commentators that Bivens
remedies would eventually be available for all constitutional rights).
25. 442 U.S. 228, 248–49 (1979).
26. Id. at 230.
27. Id. at 230 n. 3. Congressman Passman terminated Ms. Davis through a letter, which
read in part:
You are able, energetic and a very hard worker. Certainly you command the respect of those with whom you work; however, on account of the unusually heavy work load in my Washington Office,
and the diversity of the job, I concluded that it was essential that the
understudy to my Administrative Assistant be a man. I believe you
will agree with this conclusion.
Id. Needless to say, Ms. Davis did not “agree with [Passman’s] conclusion.”
28. Id. at 231. Normally, a suit against the government for sex-based discrimination
would arise under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. But because Davis’s suit was against a federal official, her suit was brought under the Fifth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause, which forbids the federal government from denying equal protection of
the law. See, e.g., Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 95 n. 1 (1979); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497, 500 (1954).
29. Davis, 442 U.S. at 243–44.
30. Id. at 241.
31. Id. (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 407 (1819)).
32. Id. (quoting McCulloch, 4 Wheat. at 407) (cleaned up).
33. Id.
34. Id.
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cause of action for wrongful termination, the Court went on to hold that this
cause of action allows for money damages.35 Money damages is the “ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in liberty.”36 And because
there are “no special factors counseling hesitation” in a suit for wrongful
termination, the Court reasoned, money damages are “surely appropriate.”37
The Court next addressed Bivens the following year in Carlson v.
Green.38 Carlson is a pivotal and peculiar case because it both greatly expanded and greatly limited the availability of Bivens suits. The Court expanded Bivens by holding that the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause gives federal prisoners an implied damages remedy for
their prison’s failure to provide adequate medical treatment.39 The Court,
however, also placed two significant limitations on Bivens suits that had
only been hinted at in past cases.40 These two limitations would serve as the
foundation for Bivens’s decline.
Carlson arose from the death of federal prison inmate Joseph Jones,
Jr.41 Despite being aware of Jones’s serious asthmatic condition, prison officials allegedly kept Jones in an unsafe prison environment “against the advice of doctors.”42 After Jones suffered an asthma attack, prison officials
“failed to give him competent medical attention for some eight hours” and
“administered contraindicated drugs [that] made his attack more severe.”43
Jones died as a result of this asthma attack.44 Jones’s estate, through his
mother, sued these officials for money damages, alleging their “deliberate
indifference” to Jones’s health and safety violated the Eighth Amendment.45
The Court, in a seven-to-two decision, allowed the plaintiff’s Eighth
Amendment claim for money damages to proceed.46 Justice Brennan, how35. Davis, 442 U.S. at 244–45.
36. Id. at 245 (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388,
395 (1971)).
37. Id. (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978). Justice Brennan noted
that a sex-based termination claim under the Fifth Amendment is not meaningfully different
from a Title VII suit, where the courts routinely award money damages. Id. As such, in a case
like this, where “it is damages or nothing,” the courts are obliged to afford a damages remedy. Id. (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 410).
38. 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
39. Id. at 16, 18–19, 25. Prisoner suits make up a considerable portion of the federal
courts’ dockets, see, e.g., MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS AND
DEFENSES 1–5 (4th ed. 2003) (noting that over 14,000 prisoner suits were filed in 1999), so
allowing federal prisoners to bring comparable suits had significant consequences.
40. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18–19.
41. Id. at 16.
42. Id. at 16 n. 1.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See id.
46. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 17–18, 23.
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ever, yet again writing for the Court, began the opinion in a somewhat curious way—by noting when Bivens suits are not available.47 Justice Brennan
noted that Bivens suits are unavailable in two circumstances: (1) when there
are “special factors counseling hesitation,” and (2) where Congress has provided an “equally effective” alternative remedy that was clearly meant to
supplant Bivens.48 The Court had hinted at these limitations in past cases,49
but it had never explicitly stated that these were hard-and-fast limitations on
Bivens. The Court found that these limitations did not apply to the plaintiff’s
Eighth Amendment suit,50 but these two exceptions laid the groundwork for
Bivens’s decline.
B.

1980–2007: Limiting Bivens

After 1980, the Court began to consistently and repeatedly retreat from
Bivens, using the two exceptions provided in Carlson.51 In Bush v. Lucas,
for example, the Court found the existence of an alternative administrative
remedy foreclosed a Bivens suit.52 In Bush, a NASA aerospace engineer alleged he was demoted for making critical statements about the agency.53
Bush appealed his demotion to the Civil Service Commission, alleging his
demotion violated the First Amendment.54 While this appeal was pending,
however, Bush also filed a Bivens suit.55 The district court dismissed Bush’s
suit, finding that the Civil Service Commission’s appeals process was an
adequate alternative remedy, thereby barring Bush’s Bivens claim.56
The Supreme Court agreed. Although the Court assumed that (a)
Bush’s First Amendment rights were violated, (b) the Civil Service Com47. Id. at 18–19.
48. Id. (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396–97).
49. See, e.g., Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 245 (1979) (“[I]n appropriate circumstances, a federal district court may provide relief in damages for the violation of constitutional rights if there are ‘no special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.’”) (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S.
478, 503 (1978) (“In Bivens, the Court . . . looked for ‘special factors counselling hesitation.’
Absent congressional authorization, a court may also be impelled to think more carefully
about whether the type of injury sustained by the plaintiff is normally compensable in damages.” (internal citations omitted)).
50. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18–19.
51. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1855–57 (2017); see also George D. Brown, Letting Statutory Tails Wag Constitutional Dogs—Have the Bivens Dissenters Prevailed?, 64
IND. L.J. 263, 275–76 (1989) (arguing that the Court’s 1983 decision in Bush v. Lucas represented a significant retreat from Bivens).
52. 462 U.S. 367, 388–90 (1983).
53. Id. at 369–70.
54. Id. at 370–71.
55. Id. at 371.
56. Id. at 371–72.
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mission’s remedies were “not as effective” as a Bivens money-damages
remedy, and (c) Congress had not foreclosed Bivens suits in this area,57 the
Court nevertheless found that the existence of a comprehensive, administrative remedial scheme precluded an implied First Amendment cause of action.58 In Carlson, the Court held that an alternative remedial scheme would
preclude a Bivens suit only if the scheme was as “equally effective” as a
Bivens suit.59 The Bush Court, however, seemingly rejected this high standard, noting that Congress could foreclose the possibility of a Bivens suit
simply by providing any reasonable alternative remedy. 60 The mere existence of an alternate remedial scheme approved by Congress, in other words,
is a “special factor counselling hesitation” that precludes a Bivens suit.
The Court continued its Bivens retreat in Schweiker v. Chilicky, where
the Court again found that the existence of a congressionally created remedial scheme precluded a Bivens cause of action.61 In the 1980s, the Reagan
administration illegally disqualified a large number of citizens from receiving their Social Security benefits.62 Pursuant to an ill-conceived “continuing
disability review” program, the Social Security Administration wrongfully
discontinued disability benefits for roughly 200,000 people.63 In response,
Congress passed emergency legislation to stop the disqualifications.64 James
Chilicky was among those whose disability benefits were wrongly denied,
causing him to suffer months of financial and medical hardship.65 Chilicky
filed a Bivens action under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause,
seeking money damages for the “emotional distress” and “loss of food [and]
shelter” that resulted from the Social Security Administration’s wrongful
denial of benefits.66
57. Id. at 372–73.
58. Bush, 462 U.S. at 368.
59. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18–19 (1980).
60. See Bush, 462 U.S. at 378 (“When Congress provides an alternative remedy, it may,
of course, indicate its intent, by statutory language, by clear legislative history, or perhaps
even by the statutory remedy itself, that the courts’ power should not be exercised.”); id. at
388 (“[W]hether an elaborate remedial system . . . should be augmented by the creation of a
new judicial remedy for the constitutional violation at issue . . . obviously cannot be answered simply by noting that existing remedies do not provide complete relief for the plaintiff.”). See also Jones v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 948 F.2d 258, 264 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that
the Civil Service Reform Act forecloses Bivens suits, even if its remedies are not as effective
as a Bivens suit for money damages).
61. 487 U.S. 412, 423–25 (1988). For a deeper dive into Chilicky, see Gene R. Nichol,
Bivens, Chilicky, and Constitutional Damages Claims, 75 VA. L. REV. 1117 (1989).
62. Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 416, 418.
63. Id. at 415–16.
64. Id. at 415–17.
65. Id. at 417–18.
66. Id. at 418–19. Among other things, Chilicky alleged that the higher-ups at the Social
Security Administration had “adopted illegal policies that led to the wrongful termination of
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On appeal, the Court prevented Chilicky’s claim from proceeding.67
Writing for the majority, Justice O’Connor noted that, since Carlson, the
Court had been hesitant to extend Bivens “into new contexts.”68 The Court
again noted several “special factors” that weighed against allowing
Chilicky’s Bivens suit to proceed.69 Most significantly, the Chilicky Court
found that Congress’s silence was evidence that it did not want to allow
Bivens suits in this context: “When the design of a [g]overnment program
suggests that Congress has provided what it considers adequate remedial
mechanisms for constitutional violations that may occur in the course of its
administration, we have not created additional Bivens remedies.”70
This was a striking departure from the reasoning in Bivens, Davis, and
Carlson. In Davis and Carlson, the Court found that Bivens suits were appropriate because Congress had not expressly disapproved of such causes of
action (i.e., Congress’s silence indicated an approval of, or at least ambivalence toward, a Bivens-like remedy).71 In Bush and Chilicky, however, the
Court found the exact opposite: that Bivens suits were inappropriate because
Congress had not expressly approved of them (i.e., Congress’s silence indicated a disapproval of a Bivens-like remedy).72 Bush and Chilicky, thus,
show that the existence of any congressionally created remedial scheme will
preclude a related Bivens action unless Congress explicitly approves of such
suits.73
Between the Court’s Chilicky decision and its 2017 ruling in Ziglar v.
Abbasi (discussed below), the Court further limited Bivens suits in three
significant ways: (1) it barred any Bivens suits arising out of military service; (2) it barred Bivens suits against private entities that were under conbenefits” and “used an impermissible quota system” that required state agencies to terminate
a predetermined numbers of recipients. Id.
67. Id. at 423–25.
68. Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 421.
69. Id. at 423.
70. Id.
71. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19 (1980) (holding that a Bivens suit was allowable
because there was “no explicit congressional declaration that persons injured by federal officers’ violations of the Eighth Amendment may not recover money damages from the agents
but [instead] must be remitted to another remedy, equally effective in the view of Congress”);
Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 246–47 (1979) (holding that a Bivens action was allowable
because there was “‘no explicit congressional declaration that persons’ in petitioner’s position
injured by unconstitutional federal employment discrimination ‘may not recover money
damages from’ those responsible for the injury”) (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971)).
72. Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 423; Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 388–90 (1983).
73. See, e.g., Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 423 (“When the design of a Government program
suggests that Congress has provided what it considers adequate remedial mechanisms for
constitutional violations that may occur in the course of its administration, we have not created additional Bivens remedies.”).
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tract with the federal government; and (3) it required the courts to determine
whether a new type of Bivens suit is, on balance, desirable.74
The Court has categorically prevented Bivens suits arising out of military service.75 In United States v. Stanley, for example, the Court barred a
U.S. service member’s lawsuit for the injuries he allegedly suffered as part
of the military’s forced LSD experiments.76 The Stanley Court blanketly
declared that “no Bivens remedy is available for injuries that ‘arise out of or
are in the course of activity incident to [military] service.’”77 Military service, in other words, is another “special factor counselling hesitation” that
prohibits a Bivens suit.78
The Court also disallowed Bivens suits against private entities in
2001’s Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko.79 In Malesko, the Federal
Bureau of Prisons contracted with a private company to operate a halfway
house.80 John Malesko was an inmate at this halfway house, and the halfway
house staff was aware that Malesko suffered from a serious heart condition.81 On one occasion, however, a halfway house guard refused to let
Malesko use the elevator to reach his fifth-floor room.82 Malesko protested
that he was specially permitted to use the elevator because of his heart condition, but the guard, for some reason, was “adamant” that Malesko use the
stairs.83 Malesko suffered a heart attack while climbing the stairs, and he
later sued the halfway house for his injuries.84
In a 5-to-4 opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court held
that private entities may not be sued under Bivens.85 The primary purpose of
Bivens remedies, Rehnquist reasoned, was to deter “individual [federal] officers from engaging in unconstitutional wrongdoing.”86 To extend Bivens to
suits against agencies and private companies, he continued, would not fur74. See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, § 9.1, at 648–51, 653–54.
75. See United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 683–84 (1987).
76. Id. at 671.
77. Id. at 684 (quoting Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950)).
78. Id. at 683 (holding that the “‘the unique disciplinary structure of the Military Establishment and Congress’ activity in the field,’” is a “special factor[] counselling hesitation”
that “require[s] abstention”) (quoting Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983). Scholars have widely criticized the Court’s decision in Stanley. See, e.g., Barry Kellman, Judicial
Abdication of Military Tort Accountability: But Who Is to Guard the Guards Themselves?,
1989 DUKE L.J. 1597 (1989); Johnathan P. Tomes, Feres to Chappell to Stanley: Three
Strikes and Service Members Are Out, 25 U. RICH. L. REV. 93 (1990).
79. 534 U.S. 61 (2001).
80. Id. at 63.
81. Id. at 64.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 63.
86. Id. at 74.
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ther this underlying purpose.87 As such, given the Court’s “caution toward
extending Bivens remedies into any new context,” the Court refused to extend Bivens to suits against private companies.88
Finally, in 2007’s Wilkie v. Robbins, the Court added an additional limitation on Bivens suits: when presented with a Bivens suit in a new context,
the courts must determine whether the suit, on balance, is desirable.89 Robbins arose from a property dispute between a Wyoming rancher and the federal Bureau of Land Management (BLM).90 The BLM failed to record an
easement on a large piece of private property in Wyoming.91 Frank Robbins
subsequently purchased that property, vitiating the government’s easement;
and when the BLM realized its mistake, it demanded that Robbins recognize
the federal government’s unrecorded easement.92 When Robbins refused,
“BLM officials mounted a seven-year campaign of relentless harassment
and intimidation to force Robbins to give in.”93 This harassment campaign
included “intentionally trespassing on Robbins’s land, inciting a neighbor to
ram a truck into Robbins while he was on horseback, breaking into his guest
lodge, filing trumped-up felony charges against him without probable cause,
and pressuring other government agents to impound Robbins’s cattle without cause.”94
In response to this harassment campaign, Robbins eventually filed a
Bivens action against the BLM officers under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.95 The Robbins Court seemingly recognized that a Bivens-type lawsuit
was the only meaningful way to vindicate Robbins’s rights.96 But the Court
87. Id. at 70–71.
88. Id. at 74 (emphasis added). Although the Malesko Court emphasized that the “core
purpose” of Bivens is to “deter[] individual [federal] officers from engaging in unconstitutional wrongdoing,” id., the Court later refused to allow Bivens suits against individual prison
guards at a private prison, Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U. S. 118, 120 (2012). When these Bivens
cases are viewed holistically, they are infuriating, because the Court is clearly just making it
up as it goes. There are no principled reasons for these rulings, and the Court consistently
talks out of both sides of its mouth. This area of law is a muddled mess to say the least.
89. 551 U.S. 537, 550, 554 (2007).
90. Id. at 541–42.
91. Id. at 542.
92. Id. Because Robbins was a bona fide purchaser—i.e., he was unaware of the federal
government’s easement when he purchased the land and the easement had not been recorded—the government lost the ability to record its easement once Robbins purchased the property, and Robbins acquired title free and clear of the government’s easement. See WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 34-1-120 (2005).
93. Robbins, 551 U.S. at 568 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
94. Tribe, supra note 23, at 29 (citing multiple pleadings, briefs, and opinions from the
Robbins case).
95. Robbins, 551 U.S. at 547–48.
96. See id. at 554 (describing the “forums of defense and redress open to Robbins” as “a
patchwork, an assemblage of state and federal, administrative and judicial benches applying
regulations, statutes and common law rules”). The Court surely took a large step back from
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nevertheless precluded Robbins’s suit because allowing a Bivens suit in this
context could lead to a wave of litigation and because of the difficulty of
proving whether federal officers were acting with a retaliatory motive. 97 The
Court, with Justice Souter writing for the majority, held that the courts must
weigh the general reasons for and against creating a new type of Bivens suit,
while “paying particular heed . . . to any special factors counselling hesitation before authorizing a new kind of federal litigation,”98 “the way common
law judges have always done.”99 Robbins, thus, “transform[ed] the Bivens
presumption in favor of a federal cause of action into a general, all-thingsconsidered, balancing test.”100
As Professor Laurence Tribe has recognized, the Robbins Court “departed from the core premise of Bivens—that the importance of constitutional rights justified implying a cause of action directly from the Constitution.”101 Robbins was different from the Court’s prior anti-Bivens decisions,
because in those cases the plaintiff at least had some alternative form of
recourse.102 In Robbins, however, the plaintiff had no form of recourse that
“would operate to deter that kind of violation or at least redress it when deterrence failed.”103
“Cases that get distinguished often enough are commonly said to die—
or at least to suffer near-death experiences.”104 Between 1980 and 2007,
Bivens suffered roughly a dozen near-death experiences. The Court’s newfound reluctance to find implied causes of action shows that Bivens, Davis,
and Carlson have “slowly become mere ghosts of their former selves, barely
clinging to existence.”105
III. THE ROBERTS COURT’S NEW BIVENS FRAMEWORK
The Court’s post-Carlson trend of limiting Bivens at every turn came to
a head in 2017’s Ziglar v. Abbasi and 2020’s Hernández v. Mesa, where the
Court essentially limited Bivens, Davis, and Carlson to their facts. The
plaintiffs’ allegations in Abbasi and Hernández were truly disturbing, yet the
Bivens in this case, as the “patchwork” of remedies available to Robbins, see id., were surely
available to the plaintiffs in Bivens, Davis, and Carlson as well.
97. Id. at 561, 556–58.
98. Id. at 550 (emphasis added) (quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378 (1983)).
99. Id. at 554.
100. Tribe, supra note 23, at 25.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 25, 67–68.
103. Id. at 25.
104. BRYAN A. GARNER ET AL., THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT 101 (2016).
105. Leading Case, Constitutional Remedies—Bivens Actions—Ziglar v. Abbasi, 131
HARV. L. REV. 313, 317–18 (2017) (quoting WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, WE THE JUDGES 199
(1956)).
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Court refused to extend Bivens in these cases. Because the Court was unwilling to extend Bivens to the “new contexts” presented in Abbasi and Hernández, it seems safe to say that the Roberts Court’s conservative majority is
unwilling to extend Bivens under any circumstances.
A.

Ziglar v. Abbasi (2017)

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the federal government detained hundreds of Muslim-American immigrants who were “of
interest.”106 Eighty-four of these detainees were held, without bail, at a detention center in Brooklyn, New York, where they were repeatedly stripsearched, verbally abused, tortured, and humiliated.107 Their bones were
broken.108 They were not allowed to have basic hygiene products, like toothbrushes or soap.109 They were kept in small cells for over twenty-three hours
a day.110 And their religious beliefs and practices were prohibited and belittled.111
After eight months of confinement, these detainees were released and
deported.112 The detainees eventually filed suit, alleging the government
“had no reason to suspect them of any connection to terrorism, and thus had
no legitimate reason to hold them for so long in these harsh conditions.”113
Among others, these detainees sued three high-ranking federal officials:
Attorney General John Ashcroft, FBI Director Robert Mueller, and Naturalization Service Commissioner James Ziglar.114 The detainees alleged these
officials implemented and oversaw a policy that was designed to imprison
and torture Muslims without adequate cause in violation of the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments.115
The detainees’ suit made it to the Supreme Court for the first time in
2009, where the Court, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, completely recalibrated the federal courts’ pleading standard to shield these federal officials from civil liability.116 After amending their complaint to comply with Iqbal’s new pleading standard, the detainees’ suit again reached the Supreme Court in Abbasi.
106. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1852 (2017).
107. Id. at 1852–53.
108. Id. at 1853.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1853.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1853–54.
116. See 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (holding, contrary to existing precedent, that federal
trial courts must disregard all conclusory, implausible allegations in a plaintiff’s complaint
when addressing a motion to dismiss).
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In Abbasi, the Court, in a 4-to-2 decision,117 held that the detainees’
Bivens suit against these high-ranking federal officials could not proceed.118
But before dismissing the detainees’ Bivens suit, the Court went on a fullblown, anti-Bivens tirade.119 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, noted
that the Court previously “followed a different approach to recognizing implied causes of action than it follows now.”120 “During this ‘ancien regime,’”
Justice Kennedy recounted, “the Court assumed it to be a proper judicial
function to ‘provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective’ a
statute’s purpose.”121 Today, however, the Court uses a “far more cautious
course before finding implied causes of action”122 and views Bivens remedies as “a ‘disfavored’ judicial activity.”123 The four-Justice Abbasi majority
then articulated an entirely new framework for addressing Bivens suits.
When asked to extend Bivens, the Court will engage in a two-step inquiry. First, the Court must determine whether the proposed Bivens suit arises in a “new context” (i.e., whether the proposed case is “different in a
meaningful way from previous Bivens cases”).124 To make things as confusing as possible, the Court provided a seven-part, non-exhaustive, nondispositive, disjunctive, multi-factor test to determine whether a case might
arise in a new context:
A case might differ in a meaningful way because of [1] the rank of the
officers involved; [2] the constitutional right at issue; [3] the generality
or specificity of the official action; [4] the extent of judicial guidance as
to how an officer should respond to the problem or emergency to be confronted; [5] the statutory or other legal mandate under which the officer
was operating; [6] the risk of disruptive intrusion by the Judiciary into
the functioning of other branches; or [7] the presence of potential special
factors that previous Bivens cases did not consider.125

If the context is not new, the case may proceed. But if the case arises in
a new context, the Court will go on to step two.
117. Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch did not participate in Abbasi. 137 U.S. at
1850. Per 28 U.S.C. § 1, only six Justices are required to reach a quorum and decided a case.
118. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1862–63.
119. See id. at 1855–58.
120. Id. at 1855.
121. Id. (quoting Alexander v. Sandoval, 532, U.S. 572, 287 (2001), and J.I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964)). As a reminder, Justice Kennedy is using the term “ancien
regime” to refer to the 1960s, 70s, and 80s. I don’t know why he felt compelled to speak
French in this portion of the opinion.
122. Id. at 1855.
123. Id. at 1857 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)).
124. Id. at 1859–60.
125. Id. at 1859–60. Given this list, the Court might as well have said, “If the case isn’t
identical to Bivens, Davis, or Carlson, dismiss the suit.”
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Second, if the context is new, the Court must then determine whether
there are “any special factors” that advise against extending Bivens into the
context presented.126 Although the Abbasi Court did not endeavor to “create
an exhaustive list” of special factors, it mentioned that the lower courts
should look to (a) whether “there are sound reasons to think Congress might
doubt the efficacy or necessity of a damages remedy” and (b) “whether the
Judiciary is well suited, absent congressional action or instruction, to consider and weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a damages action to proceed.”127 If the court finds any “special factors” weighing against the Bivens
suit, the suit should be dismissed.128
The Abbasi Court found that the detainees’ suit arose in a new context
and that there were special factors counseling against the suit (i.e., the Court
found the detainees’ Bivens suit was inappropriate and not allowed).129 The
context was “new,” the Court held, because the detainees were “challeng[ing] the confinement conditions imposed on illegal aliens pursuant to a
high-level executive policy created in the wake of a major terrorist attack on
American soil,” which was markedly different than the claims seen in
Bivens.130 And the Court held there were, more or less, four “special factors”
that counseled against the detainees’ Bivens suit: (i) the civil litigation in
this case (meaning discovery) would require the courts to inappropriately
interfere with the sensitive functions of the executive branch; (ii) the unprecedented events of September 11th required the courts to defer to the
political branches; (iii) Congress is silent on the issue, which should give the
courts pause; and (iv) if the plaintiffs were to succeed in this case, it could
uproot major executive policies, and Bivens is not the appropriate vehicle
for major policy changes.131 Accordingly, because these “special factors”
arose in a new Bivens context, the detainees’ suit was not allowed.
B.

Hernández v. Mesa (2020)

Along the U.S.-Mexico border, there is a large concrete culvert that
separates El Paso, Texas, and Juarez, Mexico.132 On June 7, 2010, Sergio
Hernández, a fifteen-year-old Mexican citizen, and several of his friends
were playing in this culvert.133 At one point, several of the kids, including
126. Hernández v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 743 (2020) (citing Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1857)).
127. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1858.
128. Id. at 1857.
129. Id. at 1860, 1862–63.
130. Id. at 1860.
131. Id. at 1860–63.
132. Hernández v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 740 (2020).
133. Id. Officer Mesa disputed that the boys were simply “playing” in the culvert; he
apparently believed that the boys were “involved in an illegal border crossing attempt,” and
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Hernández, ran up the culvert and crossed into United States territory. 134
Noticing that the boys had crossed into U.S. territory, Border Patrol Officer
Jesus Mesa detained one of the boys, at which point the other boys fled back
into Mexico.135 As Hernández ran back across the culvert into Mexico, Officer Mesa, “seemingly taking careful aim,” shot Hernández in the back of
the head, killing him.136 Officer Mesa’s bullet crossed the U.S.-Mexico border and struck Hernández while he was standing on Mexican soil.137
Hernández’s parents subsequently brought a Bivens suit against Mesa,
alleging that Mesa violated their son’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment
rights.138 The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint, and the Fifth
Circuit affirmed.139 The Supreme Court was originally set to decide this case
in 2017 but remanded the case to the Fifth Circuit so it could reevaluate the
case in light of the Court’s recent Abbasi decision.140 On remand, the Fifth
Circuit dismissed the plaintiffs’ case, relying on the Court’s Abbasi framework.141
Following Abbasi’s two-step approach, the Supreme Court, in a 5-to-4
ruling, held that Bivens did not extend to a federal agent’s cross-border
shooting because of the potential “foreign relations” and “national security”
implications that could arise if the suit was allowed to proceed.142 Justice
Alito, writing for the majority, started by noting that Bivens remedies are the
exception, not the rule.143 Although the Court used to “routinely infer[]
‘causes of action’” that “were ‘not explicit’ in the text of the provision that
was allegedly violated,”144 the Hernández Court made clear that those days
were long gone.145 Over the last forty years, Justice Alito noted, the Court
has “c[o]me to appreciate more fully the tension between [inferring causes
of action] and the Constitution’s separation of legislative and judicial pow-

he alleged that they “pelted him with rocks.” Id. However, because this case was appealed to
the Court on a motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs’ factual allegations were required to be accepted as true. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007).
134. Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 740.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 753 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 740.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 740 (citing Hernández v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017)).
141. Id. at 741.
142. Id. at 744, 746.
143. Id. at 741–42.
144. Id. at 741 (quoting Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1855 (2017)).
145. See id. at 741–44 (noting that the Court has “c[o]me to appreciate more fully the
tension” that Bivens, Davis, and Carlson placed on the Constitution, and that if these three
cases had been decided today, “it is doubtful that [the Court] would have reached the same
result”).
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er.”146 By inferring causes of action, Justice Alito argued, the Court had been
improperly stepping on Congress’s toes.147 And the Court even went so far
as to note that if Bivens had been decided today, “it is doubtful that [the
Court] would have reached the same result.”148
The Court, however, again stopped short of overruling Bivens and instead made clear that constitutionally based suits against federal officials
may proceed only if the facts of the case are virtually identical to the facts
seen in Bivens, Davis, or Carlson.149 Using new, broader language than in
Abbasi, the Court held that a plaintiff’s Bivens suit should be dismissed if
the court has any “reason to pause” about whether Bivens should apply.150
C.

The New Framework

When presented with a new Bivens suit, the courts will now follow a
two-step inquiry to determine whether the suit can proceed. First, the court
will ask whether the suit “arises in a new context.” If the context is not new,
the suit may proceed. But if the context is new, the court will proceed to step
two. Second, if the context is new, the court must determine if there are any
“special factors” that weigh against the suit. This step is essentially a general, all-things-considered policy analysis, where the court will be looking
for any reason to dismiss the suit. Structured as a flowchart, the Court’s new
Bivens framework looks roughly like this:
1. Does the plaintiff’s suit arise in a new context? If the plaintiff’s suit
is different in any meaningful way from Bivens, Davis, or Carlson, the
context is “new.”

a. A suit is likely meaningfully different from the past Bivens
cases if any of the following is true:
i. The officers involved have a higher rank than
the officers in Bivens, Davis, or Carlson;
ii. The constitutional right at issue is something
other than (a) unreasonable search or seizure under
the Fourth Amendment, (b) sex-based or racebased discrimination under the Fifth Amendment,
146. Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 741.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 742–43.
149. See id. at 743 (holding that the courts should reject a plaintiff’s Bivens suit whenever
it has “reason to pause” about whether Bivens should apply).
150. Id. If I were a betting man (which I am), I would bet this “reason to pause” language
is going to be the most cited phrase from Hernández and will be quoted in nearly every motion to dismiss and order of dismissal going forward.
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or (c) cruel and unusual punishment under the
Eighth Amendment;
iii. The alleged misconduct is very general in nature, i.e., the plaintiff does not allege a specific instance of misconduct but puts forth only thedefendant-is-bad-at-his-job-and-I-want-money allegations;
iv. The plaintiff’s proffered constitutional right
was not clearly established at the time of the alleged violation;
v. The officer was following some sort of statute
or protocol not seen in Bivens, Davis, or Carlson;
vi. Hearing the plaintiff’s suit might disrupt important functions of the legislative or executive
branch; or
vii. There are other persuasive reasons to distinguish the plaintiff’s case from Bivens, Davis, and
Carlson.151

b. If none of these issues are present, the plaintiff’s case
should be allowed to proceed. But if any of these issues are
present, the court must move to step two.

2. Are there any “special factors” that would caution against the plaintiff’s suit? If the court has any “reason to pause,” the plaintiff’s case
should be dismissed.

a. This step is a freewheeling, all-things-considered policy
analysis. The Court has not “create[d] an exhaustive list” of
special factors, but the plaintiff’s suit should be dismissed if
any of the following is true:

i. The case touches on foreign policy, national
security, or other important executive functions
not seen in Bivens, Davis, or Carlson;152
ii. The case’s discovery phase might require the
government to turn over sensitive documents; 153

151. These seven issues were provided by the Abbasi Court. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct.
1843, 1859–60 (2017).
152. Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 744–46.
153. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1860.
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iii. There is a reasonable alternative remedy available to the plaintiff, such as an administrative
remedy, the FTCA, or state law claims;154
iv. There are sound reasons to think Congress
might doubt the efficacy or necessity of a damages
remedy in the context presented;155
v. Allowing the plaintiff’s suit could cause a
flood of similar litigation in the future; 156 or
vi. It would be extremely difficult for the plaintiff
to prove the defendant had the requisite culpable
mental state.157

b. If any of these special factors are present, the plaintiff’s
case must be dismissed.

Given this new framework, it is safe to say that plaintiffs face a steep,
uphill battle in any Bivens suits that are not virtually identical to Bivens,
Davis, or Carlson. Plaintiffs’ attorneys need to be cognizant of this new
framework when drafting complaints and responding to motions to dismiss.
IV. CONCLUSION
Since the early 1980s, the Court has been reluctant to allow constitutionally based suits for money damages against federal officials. But the
Roberts Court has taken this reluctance to a new level. Through two recent
cases—Ziglar v. Abbasi and Hernández v. Mesa—the Court has made clear
that any new Bivens suits must be virtually identical to the Court’s past decisions in Bivens, Davis, or Carlson to avoid dismissal. What these decisions
mean in real-world terms is that (a) plaintiffs and their attorneys need to do
a substantial amount of legwork before filing any new Bivens suits; (b) practitioners need to be mindful of the Court’s new, intricate framework for addressing Bivens claims, and must carefully draft their complaints to comply
with this framework; and (c) any future Bivens claims are very likely to be
dismissed, meaning federal officials will not be held accountable for their
unconstitutional behavior. This article was meant to guide practitioners
through this new and always-developing area of the law.

154.
155.
156.
157.

Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 462 U.S. 367, 368, 388–90 (1983).
Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1858.
Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 560–61 (2007).
Id. at 559–60.

